Social Optima in Mean Field Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Control with
  Volatility Uncertainty by Huang, Jianhui et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
06
37
1v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
3 D
ec
 20
19
Social Optima in Mean Field Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian
Control with Volatility Uncertainty
Jianhui Huang∗, Bing-Chang Wang†, and Jiongmin Yong‡
December 16, 2019
Abstract
This paper examines mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimum control with
volatility-uncertain common noise. The diffusion terms in the dynamics of agents contain an
unknown volatility process driven by a common noise. We apply a robust optimization approach
in which all agents view volatility uncertainty as an adversarial player. Based on the principle of
person-by-person optimality and a two-step-duality technique for stochastic variational analysis,
we construct an auxiliary optimal control problem for a representative agent. Through solving this
problem combined with a consistent mean field approximation, we design a set of decentralized
strategies, which are further shown to be asymptotically social optimal by perturbation analysis.
1 Introduction
1.1 Social optimum control by mean-field analysis
The large population (LP) systems have been found wide applications across a broad spectrum includ-
ing: economics, biology, engineering, and social science [4, 7, 11, 38]. The most significant character
of LP system, is the interactive weakly-coupling structure across considerable agents: each individual
influence on whole system is negligible, but their overall population impact is substantial and cannot
be ignored. Recently, dynamic decisions of LP system become much more important along with re-
cent rapid growth of practical decision system exhibiting large-scaled interactive behaviors. The mean
field game (MFG) has drawn intensive research attention because it provides an effective theoretical
scheme to analyze asymptotic behavior of controlled LP systems. Note that LP system studied by
MFG involves numerous competitive players (or agents) endowed with competitive cost functionals.
MFG has been extensively studied from various viewpoints on either linear-quadratic-Gaussian
(LQG) setting [18, 23, 35, 28] or general nonlinear one [20, 22, 8]. In addition, MFG with common
noise is motivated by a variety of scenarios in finance and economics such as system risk [9, 12].
Apart from noncooperative MFG, social optimum control by mean field analysis has also drawn
increasing attention recently. The social optimum problem refers to a LP system in which all players
cooperate to optimize some common social cost—the sum of individual costs. Social optima are linked
to a type of team decision [13] but with highly complex interactions. All agents in team decision
access different information sets, thus social optima are decentralized and differ from classical vector
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optimization with centralized designer. When player number N −→ +∞, some mean-field team-
optimization problem is inspired to study the asymptotic behavior of LP system with two approaches
along this line: the direct method [22, 21] and fixed-point method. We list few relevant works for the
second one. Huang et al. consider social optima in mean field LQG control, and provide an asymptotic
team-optimal solution [19]. Wang and Zhang investigate a mean field social optimal problem in which
a Markov jump parameter appears as a common source of randomness for all agents [36]. For further
literature, see [1] for team-optimal control with finite population and partial information, and [31] for
the dynamic collective choice by finding a social optimum.
1.2 Volatility uncertainty with common noise
Motivated by the aforementioned studies, the present study explores a class of robust cooperative
mean field social optimum problems. Specifically, we focus on team optimization in an LQG setup
with symmetric minor agents, driven by common noise but with uncertainty in its volatility term.
More details of the motivation behind our problem are presented as follows.
In [16], the authors investigate mean field models with a global uncertainty term, which means that
all players share a common unknown deterministic disturbance. They adopted the “soft constraint”
approach [3, 10] by removing the bound of disturbance while the effort is simultaneously penalized
in cost function. The studies [34, 28] consider the case where each agent is paired with its local dis-
turbance, and provide an ǫ-Nash equilibrium by tackling a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation combined
with fixed-point analysis. Another study relevant to our work is [37] which presents robust analysis
of mean-field social control with uncertain drift only. Because of the absence of volatility uncertainty
therein, a closed-loop strategy with a consistency condition is still admissible in terms of a standard
Riccati equation. In addition, asymptotic social optimality could still be verified in [37] directly based
on a stationary condition of the strategy specified by Riccati equations obtained.
Unlike [37], this paper is devoted to volatility uncertainty of social optimum control in mean field
LQG setup with common noise. Notice that various studies of mathematical finance (e.g., pricing and
hedging [2, 25, 29]) have remarkably focused on markets with uncertain volatility. In [5], uncertain
volatility models are introduced to evaluate a scenario where the volatility coefficient of the pricing
model cannot be determined exactly. Therefore, a practical motivation here is, in many decision prob-
lems, a large number of coupled decision markers share a common noise but with uncertain volatility
on it. For instance, volatility of trading prices in a financial market is often unknown and the implied
volatility has thus been inspired and well-studied. Subsequently, when some cooperative investors
concern their team optima, it becomes necessary to study the social optimization with volatility un-
certainty. Another example is system risk minimization in an inter-banking system: all branches (of
team formation) are subject to some uncertainty in common system noise thus robust volatility anal-
ysis arises when seeking optima in joint operations. So, it is worthwhile to study cooperative mean
field model with volatility uncertainty [3, 5, 26]. Moreover, for linear dynamics (e.g., wealth process
in Merton model), their volatilities are often inexact by allowing some modeling errors; thus, when
some quadratic hedging is considered, the LQG setup is suggested and we adopt it here.
1.3 The analysis outline and comparison
At the first glance, this present study seems somewhat similar to our previous study [37] and [16].
However, various subtle and essential differences exist between them, in both setup and analysis. We
highlight some key differences below for more clear comparison.
(i) Our present study examines the uncertainty of team optimization; thus, a variational analysis
should be conducted to test the response of related componentwise Fre´chet differentials for a given
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agent. Such an analysis is not required in [16] when studying the uncertainty of mean field games
when all agents are competitive.
(ii) In team optimization, a key step is to verify (uniform) convexity of social cost functional,
that is high-dimensional. For team optimization (e.g., [19]) with standard assumption (SA), such
convexity follows directly because the SA weights are all positive (nonnegative) definite. However, it
becomes more challenging in present study because some weights are intrinsically indefinite due to
soft constraint and min-max setup here. Even though negative weight is also addressed in [16] but
(uniform) convexity therein is more tractable: only low-dimensional optimization needs to be treated
in competitive game context. More precisely, in [16], we need only to consider perturbation for a given
single agent to verify the approximate Nash equilibrium by fixing other agents’ strategies. However,
the present study must consider team perturbation for all agents instead single one only; thus, the
convexity involved is high-dimensional and indefinite, which becomes more technical to be checked.
(iii) Uncertainty (disturbance) in [16] is postulated to be deterministic on the drift term only.
Thus, the related consistency condition by the fixed-point argument, reduces to a forward-backward
ordinary differential equation (FBODE), for which the well-posdness is more tractable. For instance,
the compatibility method in [27] still works in [16] to such FBODE, but fails here to the more com-
plicated forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) of consistency condition due to
volatility uncertainty.
(iv) Unlike [37] for team optimization with drift uncertainty only, volatility uncertainty imposed
here brings more technical difficulties. For example, more subtle estimates for a fully-coupled con-
sistency FBSDE system, especially for its (backward) adjoint solution in common noise component,
should be invoked. Moreover, for the auxiliary problem construction for social optimality, the related
variational analysis becomes rather involved (see Section 5); furthermore, it differs fairly to that of
[37] mainly because of common noise and volatility uncertainty. More crucially, a two-step duality
procedure (see Section 4.2) should be applied and a new type of auxiliary problem is constructed;
whereas in [37], only single-step duality is required. In addition, different from [37], the consistency
system here requires a new embedding representation type.
To conclude, the main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
(1) The volatility uncertainty of team optimization on common noise is introduced and formulated
in a soft-constraint setting. Two sequential optimization problems are also formulated.
(2) An auxiliary control problem is constructed via a two-step duality procedure, and the consis-
tency system is obtained through embedding representation of a non-standard mean-field type FBSDE.
The related uniform convexity (concavity) is also established in high dimension case.
(3) We obtain global solvability of related FBSDEs in some nontrivial and nonstandard case.
(4) The decentralized optimal team strategy is derived in an open-loop sense, and its asymptotic
social optimality is verified in a robust social sense.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the volatility uncertainty
with soft constraint; Section 3 discusses the control problem with volatility uncertainty; Section 4
investigates team optimization in person-by-person optimality; based on this, Section 5 designs the
decentralized strategies through a consistency condition system; Section 6 analyzes the well-posedness
of FBSDEs, which arises from the consistency system; Section 7 presents asymptotic robust social
optimality of the decentralized strategy; Section 8 concludes the paper.
3
2 Problem formulation
We denote by Rk the k-dimensional Euclidean space, Rn×k the set of all n×k matrices, ⊗ the Kronecker
product. We use |·| to denote the norm of an Euclidean space, or the Frobenius norm of matrices. For a
vector or matrixM ,MT denotes its transpose; for two vectors x, y, 〈x, y〉 = xT y. For symmetric matrix
Q and a vector z, |z|2Q = zTQz, and Q > 0 (Q > 0) means that Q is positive (nonnegative) definite.
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for T > 0, for a given filtration G , {Gt}06t6T , denote L2G(0, T ;Rℓ)
(L2
G
(Ω;C([0, T ];Rℓ))) the space of all Rℓ-valued Gt-progressively measurable (continuous) processes
s(·) satisfying ‖s‖2L2 := E
∫ T
0 |s(t)|2dt < ∞ (‖s‖2max := E sup06t6T |s(t)|2 < ∞). For convenience of
presentation, we may use c (or c1, c2, . . .) to denote a generic constant which does not depend on the
population size N of LP system, and may vary from place to place.
Let (Ω,F ,F,P) be a complete filtered probability space on which a sequence of independent one-
dimensional Brownian motions {Wi(t), i = 0, 1, · · · , N} are defined, where F = {Ft}06t6T is the
natural filtration of {Wi(t), i = 0, 1, · · · , N} augmented by all the P-null sets in F . Consider a linear
stochastic LP systems with N agents (or, particles), in which the ith-agent Ai evolves by
dxi(t) = [Axi(t) +Bui(t) + f(t)]dt+ [Dui(t) + σ(t)]dWi(t)
+[C0xi(t) +D0ui(t) + σ0(t)]dW0(t), xi(0) = x0, i = 1, · · · , N, (1)
where xi(·) and ui(·) are state and input of agent Ai, valued in Rn and Rr, respectively, and x0 ∈ Rn
is a constant vector; Coefficients A,B,D,C0,D0 are constant matrices of suitable sizes; Wi(·) is
a Brownian motion representing the idiosyncratic noise for agent Ai; while W0(·) is a Brownian
motion representing a common noise shared by all agents (similar setup can be found in [7, 17]). For
i = 0, 1, · · · , N , let Fi = {F it}06t6T be the natural filtration of Wi(·) augmented by all the P-null
sets. Then, F = {Ft}06t6T = {σ(
⋃N
i=0F it )}06t6T is called the centralized information. σ0 is unknown
volatility but note that it might not be only F0 = {F0t }06t6T -adapted with F0 the information
generated by common noise W0(·).
Remark 1 Individual diffusion part of (1) driven by Wi does not include term like Cxi as in standard
LQ control literature, mainly due to two concerns. First, introduction of Cxi will bring considerable
technical difference in relevant analysis and we plan to address it in future work; second, the current
setup is still rather general, especially including risky investments as its special case (i.e., σ = 0).
For simplicity, we assume that all the agents have the same initial state. It is not hard to extend our
results to the case that initial states of agents are i.i.d. random variables.
When D,D0 6= 0, control process enters diffusion terms (driven by Wi(·),W0(·)) of (1), and in
this case (1) is said to be diffusion-controlled. The study of diffusion-controlled systems has attracted
extensive attentions, mainly because of their modeling power and application potentials in operational
research and mathematical finance, etc. The readers may refer to [41, 4, 32] for relevant study
of LQ diffusion-controlled systems, and related applications in mean-variance and portfolio selection
problems. By comparison, the drift-controlled (i.e., D = D0 = 0, B 6= 0) system is more classical in LQ
literature and has been broadly-adopted in most mean-field game or team studies (e.g. [18, 19, 35]).
Besides modeling, the diffusion-controlled system also differs from drift-controlled one in relevant
analysis, for example, on the study of related Riccati equations and Hamiltonian systems.
Given state dynamics (1), the cost functional of Ai is given by
Ji(u) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
{∣∣xi(t)− Γx(N)(t)− η(t)∣∣2Q + |ui(t)|2R}dt+ 12E|xi(T )− Γ0x(N)(T )− η0|2G, (2)
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where x(N) = 1
N
∑N
j=1 xj is weakly-coupled state-average, and u = {u1, . . . , uN} ∈ Rr×N the team
strategy. The admissible strategy set of Ai is in the distributed sense:
Uri =
{
ui(·) ∈ L2Hi(0, T ;Rr) : Hi = {Hit}0≤t≤T ,Hit , σ
{F0t ∪ F it ∪ σ(xi(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t)}}.
Here, {Hit} denotes the decentralized (or, distributed) information for the individual agent Ai. Note
that xi is not {F it}-adapted because of the state-average coupling x(N); thus, the inclusions of σ(xi(s))
and F it are both necessary in above formulation. For comparison, the centralized strategy set is:
Urc =
{
ui(·) ∈ L2F(0, T ;Rr)
}
.
Denote the social cost under volatility with soft constraint by
J (N)soc (u, σ0) =
N∑
i=1
(
Ji(u)− 1
2
E
∫ T
0
|σ0(t)|2R0dt
)
with R0 being the attenuation parameter of soft constraint (see [3]). The main goal of the current
paper is to seek a set of distributed strategies to minimize the social cost under soft constraint for
system (1)–(2), i.e.,
(P) minimizeui∈Uri J
wo
soc(u) with J
wo
soc(u)
∆
= sup
σ0∈Unc
J (N)soc (u, σ0)
over {u = (u1, · · · ui, · · · , uN ), ui ∈ Uri , i = 1, · · · , N}, where Jwosoc(u) is the social cost under the
worst-case volatility.
To simplify the analysis, we introduce the following hypothesis.
(H1) The state and cost functional coefficients satisfy:{
A,C0,Γ,Γ0 ∈ Rn×n, B,D,D0 ∈ Rn×r,
Q > 0, R > 0, R0 > 0, G > 0, f, σ, σ0, η, η0 ∈ L2F(0, T,Rn).
Under (H1), by [41], for any x0 and ui ∈ Urc , (1) admits a unique strong solution
xT (·) = (xT1 (·), · · · , xTi (·), · · · , xTN (·)) ∈ L2F(Ω;C([0, T ];RnN ))
with the following estimates hold true: for some c1 independent of N ,
E sup
06t6T
|x(t)|2 6 c1E
[
N |x0|2 +N
( ∫ T
0
|f(s)|ds)2 +N ∫ T
0
(|σ0(s)|2 + |σ(s)|2)ds+ N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
|ui(s)|2ds
]
.
3 The control problem with respect to volatility uncertainty
From now on, the time variable t might be suppressed when no confusion occurs. Let ui ∈ Urc , i =
1, · · · , N be fixed. The optimal control problem with volatility uncertainty can be formulated as
(P1) maximizeσ0∈Unc J
(N)
soc (u, σ0)
which is equivalent to:
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(P1′) minimize Jˇ (N)soc over σ0 ∈ Unc , where
Jˇ (N)soc (σ0) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{
− ∣∣xi − Γx(N) − η∣∣2Q + |σ0|2R0}dt− 12E|xi(T )− Γ0x(N)(T )− η0|2G.
Hereafter, the following notations will be used to enable more compact representation. Let u =
(uT1 , · · · , uTN )T , 1 = (1, · · · , 1)T , σi = (0, · · · , 0, σT , 0, · · · , 0)T , A = Diag(A, · · · , A), B =
Diag(B, · · · , B),Di=Diag(0, · · · , 0,D, 0, · · · , 0),C0 = Diag(C0, · · · , C0), D0= Diag(D0, · · · ,D0) and
x0 = (x
T
0 , · · · , xT0 ).
Remark 2 Hereafter, whenever necessary, we may exchange the usage of notation u = (u1,· · · ,
uN ) ∈ Rr×N and u = (uT1 , · · · , uTN )T ∈ RrN by noting they both represent the team decision profile
among all agents, but only differ in formations.
With above notations, we can rewrite dynamics of all agents in a more compact form:
dx(t) =Ax(t)dt+Bu(t)dt+ 1⊗ f(t)dt+
N∑
i=1
[Diu(t) + σi(t)]dWi(t)
+ [C0x(t) +D0u(t) + 1⊗ σ0(t)]dW0(t), x(0) = x0.
Recall ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Also, we introduce the following notations:{
Ξ1 := Γ
TQ+QΓ− ΓTQΓ, Ξ2 := Qη − ΓTQη,
ΞG1 := Γ
T
0G+GΓ0 − ΓT0GΓ0, ΞG2 := Gη0 − ΓT0Gη0.
(3)
By rearranging the integrand of Jˇ
(N)
soc , we have
Jˇ (N)soc =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
(
− |x|2
Qˆ
+ 2ηˆTx+N |σ0|2R0
)
dt− 1
2
E
(|x(T )|2
Gˆ
− 2ηˆT0 x(T )
)
, (4)
where ηˆ = 1⊗ Ξ2, ηˆ0 = 1⊗ ΞG2 , and Qˆ = (Qˆij), Gˆ = (Gˆij) are given respectively by
Qˆii = Q− Ξ1/N, Qˆij = −Ξ1/N, Gˆii = G− ΞG1 /N, Gˆij = −ΞG1 /N, 1 6 i 6= j 6 N. (5)
Denote
Γi =
[
− Γ
N
, · · · ,− Γ
N
, I − Γ
N
,− Γ
N
, · · · ,− Γ
N
]
,
where I − Γ
N
is the ith element. Note Qˆ =
∑N
i=1Γ
T
i QΓi. Then
λmin(Q)
N∑
i=1
ΓTi Γi 6 Qˆ 6 λmax(Q)
N∑
i=1
ΓTi Γi.
For further analysis, we assume
(H2) Jˇ
(N)
soc (σ0) of (P1
′) is convex in σ0;
(H2′) Jˇ (N)soc (σ0) of (P1′) is uniformly convex in σ0.
We have the following equivalent conditions that ensure (H2).
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Proposition 1 The following statements are equivalent:
(i) Jˇ
(N)
soc (σ0) is convex in σ0;
(ii) For any σ0 ∈ Unc ,
E
∫ T
0
(
− zT Qˆz+NσT0 R0σ0
)
dt− E|z(T )|2
Gˆ
> 0,
where z ∈ RnN satisfies {
dz =Azdt+ (C0z+ 1⊗ σ0)dW0,
z(0) = 0.
(iii) J¯ ′i(σ0) is convex in σ0, where
J¯ ′i(σ0)
∆
=E
∫ T
0
{
− ∣∣(I − Γ)zi∣∣2Q + |σ0|2R0}dt− E|(I − Γ0)zi(T )|2G
subject to
dzi(t) = Azi(t)dt+ [C0zi(t) + σ0(t)]dW0(t), zi(0) = 0. (6)
Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii) is given in [16]. From (6), we have z1 = z2 = · · · = zN = z(N). Thus,
E
∫ T
0
(
− |z|2
Qˆ
+N |σ0|2R0
)
dt− E|z(T )|2
Gˆ
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
(
−
∣∣zi − Γzi∣∣2Q + |σ0|2R0)dt− N∑
i=1
E|(I − Γ0)zi(T )|2G
=N
[
E
∫ T
0
(
− ∣∣(I − Γ)zi∣∣2Q + |σ0|2R0)dt− E|(I − Γ0)zi(T )|2G], (7)
which implies that (ii) is equivalent to (iii). 
Denote 1ˆ = 1⊗ I. By [33], if the following Riccati equation
P˙+ATP+PA+CT0PC0 − Qˆ−
(
1ˆ
T
PC0
)T [
NR0 + 1ˆ
T
P1ˆ
]−1
1ˆ
T
PC0 = 0,
P(T ) = −Gˆ
(8)
admits a solution such that NR0+ 1ˆ
T
P1ˆ > 0, then Jˇ
(N)
soc (σ0) is uniformly convex, which further gives
that (H2′) holds. The above condition (8) is of high-dimension nN×nN which is not feasible to verify.
Alternatively, we give the following necessary and sufficient condition with low-dimensionality.
Proposition 2 The following statements are equivalent:
(i) Jˇ
(N)
soc (σ0) is uniformly convex in σ0;
(ii) J¯ ′i(σ0) is uniformly convex in σ0;
(iii) The equation
K˙ +KA+ATK + CT0 KC0 − CT0 K(K +R0)−1KC0 + Ξ1 −Q = 0, K = ΞG1 −G. (9)
admits a solution such that K +R0 > 0.
Proof. (i) By (7) and [24], we have (i)⇔(ii). (ii)⇔(iii) is implied from [33]. 
By examining the variation of Jˇ
(N)
soc , we obtain the following result.
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Theorem 3 Suppose that R0 > 0, then for any fixed admissible strategy set u = (u1, · · · , uN ) ∈∏N
i=1 Uri , Problem (P1′) has a minimizer σ∗0(u) if and only if (H2) holds and the following forward-
backward equation system admits a solution (xi, pi, {βji }Nj=0):
dxi =(Axi+Bui+f)dt+(Dui+σ)dWi+
(
C0xi+D0ui−R
−1
0
N
N∑
j=1
β0j
)
dW0,
dpi =− [AT pi + CT0 β0i −Qxi + Ξ1x(N) + Ξ2]dt+ β0i dW0 +
N∑
j=1
βji dWj ,
xi(0) = x0, pi(T ) = (−G)xi(T ) + ΞG1 x(N)(T ) + ΞG2 , i = 1, · · · , N.
(10)
In this case, the minimizer σ∗0(u) = −R
−1
0
N
∑N
j=1 β
0
j .
Proof. The “if” part follows directly by the standard completion of square technique for (P1′) and
stationary condition reasoning for quadratic functional.
For “only if” part, suppose σ∗0 is a minimizer to Problem (P1
′). x∗i is the optimal state of agent i
under the volatility σ∗0 . x
(N)
∗ = 1N
∑N
j=1 x
∗
j . For i = 1, 2, · · · , N, denote δxi = xi − x∗i the increment
of xi along with the variation δσ0 = σ0 − σ∗0. Similarly, δx(N) = 1N
∑N
j=1 δxj and δJˇ
(N)
soc (σ∗0 , δσ0) =
Jˇ
(N)
soc (σ0)− Jˇ (N)soc (σ∗0) + o(||δσ0||L2), the Fre´chet differential of Jˇ (N)soc on σ∗0 along with direction δσ0. By
(1),
d(δxi) = A(δxi)dt+ [C0(δxi) + δσ0]dW0, δxi(0) = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (11)
By standard variational principle, we have the following stationary condition on Fre´chet differential:
0 =δJˇ (N)soc (σ
∗
0 , δσ0)
=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{
〈−Q[x∗i − (Γx(N)∗ + η)], δxi − Γδx(N)〉+ 〈R0σ∗0 , δσ0〉}dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
{〈−G[x∗i (T )− (Γ0x(N)∗ (T ) + η0)], δxi(T )− Γδx(N)(T )〉}.
(12)
Introduce the adjoint equation
dpi = αidt+ β
0
i dW0 + β
i
idWi +
∑
j 6=i
βji dWj, pi(T ) = (−G)x∗i (T ) + ΞG1 x(N)∗ (T ) + ΞG2 , (13)
where the processes {αi}Ni=1, {β0i }Ni=1 and {βji }i 6=j are to be determined. Then by Itoˆ’s formula,
E[〈(−G)xi(T ) + ΞG1 x(N)(T ) + ΞG2 , xi(T )〉]
=E
∫ T
0
[〈αi, δxi〉+ 〈pi, Aδxi〉+ 〈β0i , δσ0〉]dt. (14)
It follows by (12)-(14) that
0 =E
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
[〈−Q(x∗i − (Γx(N)∗ + η)), δxi − Γδx(N)〉+ 〈R0σ∗0, δσ0〉]dt
+
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
[〈αi, δxi〉+ 〈pi, Aδxi〉+ 〈β0i , C0δxi + δσ0〉+ 〈βii , 0〉]dt
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=E
∫ T
0
〈
NR0σ
∗
0 +
N∑
i=1
β0i , δσ0
〉
dt+ E
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
〈
−Q[x∗i − (Γx(N)∗ + η)]
+ ΓTQ
[
(I − Γ)x(N)∗ − η
]
+ αi +A
T pi + C
T
0 β
0
i , δxi
〉
dt,
which leads to
αi =−
[
AT pi + C
T
0 β
0
i + Γ
TQ
[
(I − Γ)x(N)∗ − η
]−Q[x∗i − (Γx(N)∗ + η)],
σ∗0 =−
R−10
N
N∑
i=1
β0i .
Thus, the Hamiltonian system (10) admits a solution (x∗i , pi, {βji }Nj=0). 
Let p(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 pi and β
(N)
0 =
1
N
∑N
i=1 β
0
i . It follows from (10) that state-average limits
xˆ = limN−→+∞ x(N), pˆ = limN−→+∞ p(N), and βˆ0 = limN−→+∞ β
(N)
0 satisfy:
dxˆ =(Axˆ+Buˆ+ f)dt+ (C0xˆ+D0uˆ−R−10 βˆ0)dW0,
dpˆ =− [AT pˆ+ CT0 βˆ0 − (Q− Ξ1)xˆ+ Ξ2]dt+ βˆ0dW0,
xˆ(0) = x, pˆ(T ) = (ΞG1 −G)xˆ(T ) + ΞG2 .
(15)
4 The control problem of agent i: person-by-person optimality
4.1 Some variational analysis
When the volatility σ∗0 = −R
−1
0
N
∑N
j=1 β
0
j is applied, we turn to study the outer minimization problem
for team agents.
(P2): minimize Jwosoc(u) over {u = (u1, · · · , uN )|ui ∈ Urc }, where
Jwosoc(u) ,J
(N)
soc (u, σ
∗
0(u))
=
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{∣∣xi − Γx(N) − η∣∣2Q + |ui|2R − |σ∗0(u)|2R0}dt
+
1
2
E|xi(T )− Γ0x(N)(T )− η0|2G, (16)
subject to 
dxi=(Axi+Bui+f)dt+(Dui+σ)dWi+
(
C0xi+D0ui−R
−1
0
N
N∑
k=1
β0k
)
dW0,
dpi=− (AT pi + CT0 β0i −Qxi + Ξ1x(N) + Ξ2)dt+ β0i dW0 +
N∑
k=1
βki dWk,
xi(0) = x0, pi(T ) = (−G)xi(T ) + ΞG1 x(N)(T ) + ΞG2 .
(17)
For further analysis, we introduce the following assumption.
(H3) Jwosoc(u) of (P2) is convex in u.
Suppose u¯ = (u¯1, · · · , u¯i, · · · , u¯N ) and x¯ = (x¯1, · · · , x¯i, · · · , x¯N ) are respectively the centralized
optimal control and states of (P2) and we make the following person-by-person optimality variation
around its optimal point. We now perturb the control ofAi to be ui and keep (u¯1, · · · , u¯i−1, u¯i+1, · · · , u¯N ),
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the strategies of all other agents fixed. Let δui = ui − u¯i, and δui ∈ Urc . Denote δxj = xj − x¯j,
δpj = pj− p¯j, and δβkj = βkj − β¯kj , j, k = 1, · · · , N the corresponding (forward, adjoint) state variation.
By (10) and (17), we have
d(δxi)=(Aδxi+Bδui)dt+(Dδui)dWi
+
(
C0δxi+D0δui−R
−1
0
N
N∑
k=1
δβ0k
)
dW0, δxi(0) = 0,
d(δpi) =−
(
AT δpi + C
T
0 δβ
0
i −Qδxi + Ξ1δx(N)
)
dt+ δβ0i dW0
+ δβiidWi +
∑
k 6=i
δβki dWk, δpi(T ) = (−G)δxi(T ) + ΞG1 δx(N)(T ),
(18)
and for j 6= i,
d(δxj) =Aδxjdt+
(
C0δxj − R
−1
0
N
N∑
l=1
δβ0l
)
dW0, δxj(0) = 0,
d(δpj) =−
(
AT δpj + C
T
0 δβ
0
j −Qδxj + Ξ1δx(N)
)
dt+ δβ0j dW0 + δβ
j
jdWj
+
∑
l 6=j
δβljdWl, δpj(T ) = (−G)δxj(T ) + ΞG1 δx(N)(T ).
(19)
This implies that for any j, j′ 6= i, δxj = δxj′ , which further gives
δpj = δpj′ , δβ
0
j = δβ
0
j′ , for j, j
′ 6= i. (20)
Let EF0 [·] ∆= E[·|F0t ] (suppressing t). Note that Wj is independent of W0. It follows from (18) that
d(EF0 [δxi]) =
(
AEF0 [δxi] +BEF0 [δui]
)
dt
+
(
C0EF0 [δxi] +D0EF0 [δui]−
R−10
N
N∑
k=1
EF0 [δβ
0
k ]
)
dW0,
d(EF0 [δpi]) =−
(
ATEF0 [δpi]+C
T
0 EF0 [δβ
0
i ]−QEF0 [δxi]+Ξ1EF0 [δx(N)]
)
dt
+ EF0 [δβ
0
i ]dW0,
EF0
0
[δxi(0)] =0, EF0
T
[δpi(T )] = (−G)EF0
T
(δxi(T )) + Ξ
G
1 EF0
T
(δx(N)(T )).
(21)
It follows from (19) that for j 6= i
d(EF0 [δxj ]) =AEF0 [δxj ]dt+
(
C0EF0 [δxj ]−
R−10
N
N∑
k=1
EF0 [δβ
0
k ]
)
dW0,
d(EF0 [δpj ]) =−
(
ATEF0 [δpj ] + C
T
0 EF0 [δβ
0
j ]−QEF0 [δxj ]
+ Ξ1EF0 [δx
(N)]
)
dt+ EF0 [δβ
0
j ]dW0,
EF0
0
[δxj(0)]=0,EF0
T
[δpj(T )]= (−G)EF0
T
(δxj(T ))+Ξ
G
1 EF0
T
(δx(N)(T )).
(22)
Denote δJwosoc(u¯, δui) the Fre´chet differential of J
wo
soc at u¯ along with direction δui:
Jwosoc(u¯+δui)−Jwosoc(u¯)=δJwosoc(u¯, δui)+o(‖δui‖L2)=〈DuiJwosoc(u¯), δui〉+o(‖δui‖L2) (23)
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where DuiJwosoc(u¯) is the Fre´chet derivative of Jwosoc at u¯ with componentwise variation (0,· · ·δuTi · · ·, 0).
Then, from (20), we can obtain that for j 6= i,
δJwosoc(u¯, δui)
=E
∫ T
0
[〈
Q(x¯i−Γx¯(N)−η), δxi
〉
+
〈
Q
(
I−N − 1
N
Γ
)
x¯(N)− x¯i
N
−N − 1
N
η), Nδxj
〉
− 〈 1
N
∑
j 6=i
ΓTQ(x¯j−Γx¯(N)−η), δxi
〉−〈R−10 β¯(N)0 , δβ0i 〉−〈R−10 β¯(N)0 , (N − 1)δβ0j 〉
− 〈ΓTQ((x¯(N) − x¯i
N
− N − 1
N
Γx¯(N) − N − 1
N
η
)
, (N − 1)δxj
〉
+
〈
Ru¯i, δui
〉]
dt
+ E
[〈
G(x¯i(T )− Γ0x¯(N)(T )− η0), δxi(T )
〉− 〈ΓT0G(x¯i(T )− Γ0x¯(N)(T )− η0),
δx(N)(T )
〉
+
∑
j 6=i
〈
G(x¯j(T )− Γ0x¯(N)(T )− η0), δxj(T )
〉
−
∑
j 6=i
〈
ΓT0G(x¯j(T )− Γ0x¯(N)(T )− η0), δx(N)(T )
〉]
.
When N → +∞, from (15), we further have
lim
N→+∞
δJwosoc(u¯, δui) := δJˆi(u¯, δui) = 〈Dui Jˆi(u¯), δui〉
=E
∫ T
0
[〈
Qx¯i, δxi
〉− 〈Q(Γxˆ+ η) + ΓTQ((I − Γ)xˆ− η), δxi〉+ 〈Ru¯i, δui〉
− 〈R−10 βˆ0, δβ0i 〉− 〈R−10 βˆ0, δβ∗〉
+
〈
Q((I − Γ)xˆ− η)− ΓTQ((I − Γ)xˆ− η), δx∗〉]dt
+ E
[〈
Gx¯i(T ), δxi(T )
〉− 〈G(Γ0xˆ(T ) + η0), δxi(T )〉
+
〈
G((I − Γ0)xˆ(T )− η0), δx∗(T )
〉−〈ΓT0G((I−Γ0)xˆ(T )−η0), δxi(T )〉
−〈ΓT0G((I−Γ0)xˆ(T )−η0), δx∗(T )〉]
(24)
where δJˆi(u¯, δui) is the Fre´chet differential of some auxiliary cost functional Jˆi, to be constructed later
(see (P3) in Section 5), Dui Jˆi(u¯) the related Fre´chet derivative, and state average limits (xˆ, βˆ0) is to
be determined by consistency condition in Section 5; moreover, for j 6= i, the quantities
δx∗ := NEF0 [δxj ], δp
∗ := NEF0 [δpj ], δβ
∗ := NEF0 [δβ
0
j ],
do not depend on N , and satisfy the following equations:
d(δx∗) =A(δx∗)dt+ [C0(δx∗)−R−10 (δβ∗ + EF0 [δβ0i ])]dW0, δx∗(0) = 0,
d(δp∗) =−[AT (δp∗)+CT0 (δβ∗)−Q(δx∗)+Ξ1(EF0 [δxi]+δx∗)]dt
+(δβ∗)dW0, δp∗(T ) = ΞG1 EF0
T
(δxi(T ))− (G− ΞG1 )δx∗(T ).
Remark 3 When studying the asymptotic behavior of (24) with N −→ +∞, the following remainder
term needs to be considered
ǫ
(N)
1 :=E
∫ T
0
[
− 〈Ξ1(x¯(N) − xˆ), δxi〉 − 〈R−10 (β¯(N)0 − βˆ0), δβ0i + (N − 1)δβ0j 〉
+ 〈(Q− Ξ1)(x¯(N) − xˆ), Nδxj〉
]
dt− E[〈ΞG1 (x¯(N)(T )− xˆ(T )), δxi(T )〉]
+ E[〈(G − ΞG1 )(x¯(N)(T )− xˆ(T )), Nδxj(T )〉].
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Because ‖δui‖L2 <∞, ǫ(N)1 should be an infinitesimal term with same order to ‖x¯(N)− xˆ‖max+‖β¯(N)0 −
βˆ0‖L2 (N →∞). Actually, from (10) and (15) we may obtain ‖x¯(N)− xˆ‖2max+ ‖β¯(N)0 − βˆ0‖2L2 = O( 1N )
(The rigorous proof will be given in Section 7). Thus, ǫ
(N)
1 = O(
1√
N
)‖δui‖L2‖u¯‖L2 .
4.2 Duality derivation
A key point in analyzing the social optimization problem is to formulate some auxiliary control prob-
lem for a given agent, based on δJˆi = limN→+∞ δJwosoc of (24), thus the decentralized strategy can
be derived via some mean-field game procedure. Such auxiliary problem can be derived via some
variational analysis (see [37] for related variational analysis but with only drift-controlled term). Due
to volatility uncertainty, all states of agents are coupled via some high-dimensional FBSDE system.
Therefore, related variational analysis becomes fairly different to that of [37], and depends on a two-
step duality procedure, as discussed below.
Step 1. (Duality independent of (δx∗, δp∗)).
The first step removes the dependence of δJˆi(u¯, δui) on (δx
∗, δp∗), the variational process common to
all agents. To this end, introduce the adjunct FBSDE:{
dy = f0dt+ zdW0(t), y(T ) =
(
G− ΞG1
)
xˆ(T )− ΞG2 ,
dh = f1dt+ f2dW0(t), h(0) = 0
(25)
where the drivers (f0; f1, f2) are to be determined. Note h(0) = 0, and
δp∗(T )− ΞG1 EF0
T
(δxi)(T )− (G− ΞG1 )δx∗(T ) = 0.
By Itoˆ’s formula,
0 =E
∫ T
0
{〈
h,− (AT δp∗ + CT0 (δβ∗) + Ξ1EF0(δxi)− (Q− Ξ1)(δx∗))
− ΞG1
(
AEF0(δxi) +BEF0(δui)− (G− ΞG1 )A(δx∗)
)〉
+
〈
δp∗ − ΞG1 EF0(δxi)− (G − ΞG1 )δx∗(t), f1
〉
+
〈
f2, δβ
∗ − ΞG1 (C0EF0(δxi) +D0EF0(δui))
−(G− ΞG1 )
[
C0(δx
∗)−R−10
(
δβ∗ + EF0(δβ
0
i )
)]〉}
dt.
(26)
Using Itoˆ formula to 〈δx∗, y〉, we have
E
〈
(G− ΞG1 )xˆ(T )− ΞG2 , δx∗(T )
〉
= E
[ ∫ T
0
〈δx∗, f0〉+ 〈AT y, δx∗〉+ 〈z, C0δx∗ −R−10 (δβ∗ + EF0(δβ0i ))〉
]
dt.
It follows from (25) and (26) that
E
〈
(G− ΞG1 )xˆ(T )− ΞG2 , δx∗(T )
〉
= E
∫ T
0
[〈
δx∗, f0 +AT y + CT0 z + (Q− Ξ1)Th−AT (G− ΞG1 )Th
− (G− ΞG1 )T f1 − CT0 (G− ΞG1 )f2
〉
+ 〈δp∗,−Ah+ f1〉
+ 〈δβ∗,−R−10 z − C0h+ f2 +R−10 (G− ΞG1 )f2〉
+ 〈EF0(δui),−BTΞG1 h−DT0 ΞG1 f2〉+〈EF0(δβ0i ),−R−10 z+R−10 (G−ΞG1 )f2〉
+ 〈EF0(δxi),−ΞT1 h−AT (ΞG1 )Th− (ΞG1 )T f1 − CT0 ΞG1 f2〉
]
dt.
(27)
12
Set
I
G :=
[
I +R−10 (G− ΞG1 )
]−1
(28)
(note that IG = I if G = 0). Comparing the coefficients, we obtain
f1 =Ah, f2 = I
G(R−10 z + C0h+R
−1
0 βˆ0)
f0 =− (AT y + CT0 z + (Q− Ξ1)h−AT (G− ΞG1 )h− (G− ΞG1 )f1
− CT0 (G− ΞG1 )f2 + (Q− Ξ1)xˆ− Ξ2).
(29)
Then, we have
dy =−
[
AT y + CT0 z + (Q− Ξ1)h−AT (G− ΞG1 )h− (G− ΞG1 )Ah
− CT0 (G−ΞG1 )IG(R−10 z+C0h+R−10 βˆ0)+(Q−Ξ1)xˆ−Ξ2
]
dt+zdW0(t)
dh =Ahdt+ IG(R−10 z + C0h+R
−1
0 βˆ0)dW0(t)
y(T ) = (G− ΞG1 )xˆ(T )− ΞG2 , h(0) = 0.
(30)
Let ξ1 = (Q− Ξ1)xˆ− Ξ2, and ξ2 = −R−10 βˆ0. From (27), we obtain
E
〈
(G− ΞG1 )xˆ(T )− ΞG2 , δx∗(T )
〉
+ E
∫ T
0
[〈δx∗, ξ1〉+ 〈δβ∗, ξ2〉]dt
= E
∫ T
0
[ 〈
EF0(δβ
0
i ),−R−10 z +R−10 (G− ΞG1 )f2
〉
+
〈
EF0(δui),−BTΞG1 h−DT0 ΞG1 f2
〉
+
〈
EF0(δxi),−Ξ1h−ATΞG1 h− Ξ1f1 − CT0 ΞG1 f2
〉 ]
dt.
Then a direct computation from (24) shows that
δJˆi(u¯, δui)) = lim
N→+∞
δJwosoc(u¯, δui)
= E
∫ T
0
[〈Qx¯i, δxi〉+〈Ru¯i, δui〉−〈Ξ1xˆ+Ξ2, δxi〉−〈R−10 βˆ0, δβ0i 〉]dt
+ E[〈Gxˆi(T ), δxi(T )〉 − 〈ΞG1 xˆ(T ) + ΞG2 , δxi(T )〉]
+ E
∫ T
0
[
〈−R−10 z +R−10 (G− ΞG1 )IG(R−10 z + C0h+R−10 βˆ0), δβ0i 〉
+ 〈δxi,−Ξ1h−ATΞG1 h−ΞG1 Ah−CT0 ΞG1 f2〉−〈δui, BTΞG1 h+DT0 ΞG1 f2〉
]
dt.
(31)
Let ξ3 = −R−10 (z + βˆ0) +R−10 (G− ΞG1 )f2. Then we will consider the following term in step 2,
E
∫ T
0
[− 〈R−10 βˆ0, δβ0i 〉+ 〈−R−10 z +R−10 (G− ΞG1 )f2, δβ0i 〉]dt = E ∫ T
0
〈ξ3, δβ0i 〉dt.
Step 2. (Duality independent of (δβ0i )).
The second step removes the dependence of δJˆi(u¯, δui) on backward variational process δβ
0
i . Thus,
the derived auxiliary problem will end up with a forward LQ control on (δui, δxi) only. To this end,
first introduce the adjoint process
dΦ = g1dt+ g2dW0(t), Φ(0) = 0,
13
with g1, g2 to be determined. Note
dδpi = −
(
AT δpi + C
T
0 δβ
0
i −Qδxi +Ξ1δx(N)
)
dt+ δβ0i dW0 +
N∑
k=1
δβki dWk(t)
δpi(T ) = (−G)δxi(T ) + ΞG1 δx(N)(T ).
Then, by Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
0 = E
∫ T
0
[〈δpi,−AΦ+ g1〉+ 〈δβ0i ,−C0Φ+ g2〉
+〈δxi, QTΦ+ATGΦ+Gg1+CT0 Gg2〉 − 〈δui, BTGΦ+DT0 Gg2〉
]
dt
(32)
which implies g1 = AΦ, and g2 = C0Φ− ξ2 = C0Φ+R−10 (z + βˆ)−R−10 (G− ΞG1 )f2. Then we have
dΦ = AΦdt+
[
C0Φ+R
−1
0 (z + βˆ0)−R−10 (G− ΞG1 )f2
]
dW0(t),Φ(0) = 0,
which with (29) gives Φ = h. From (32),
E
∫ T
0
〈δβ0i , ξ3〉dt=E
∫ T
0
[〈δxi, QTΦ+ATGΦ+Gg1+ CT0 Gg2〉+ 〈δui, BTGΦ+DT0 Gg2〉]dt.
From this with (31), the variational functional becomes
δJˆi(u¯, δui) =E
∫ T
0
[
〈Qx¯i, δxi〉+〈Ru¯i, δui〉
−〈Ξ1xˆ+Ξ2, δxi〉+
〈
QTh+ATGh+GAh+CT0 Gg2, δxi
〉
−〈Ξ1h+ATΞG1 h+ΞG1 Ah+CT0 ΞG1 f2, δxi〉
+ 〈BTGh+DT0 Gg2, δui〉+〈−BTΞG1 h−DT0 Gg2, δui〉
]
dt
+ E[〈Gx¯i(T ), δxi(T )〉 − 〈ΞGi xˆ(T ) + ΞG2 , δxi(T )〉]
(33)
where g2 = f2 = I
G
(
R−10 (z + βˆ0) + C0h
)
.
5 Decentralized robust team strategy design
By (15) and limiting social variational functional (33), we construct the following auxiliary control
problem, for a representative agent, still indexed by Ai.
(P3): minimize Jˆi(ui) over ui ∈ Ui, with state dynamics and cost functional:
dxi=(Axi+Bui+f)dt+(Dui+σ)dWi+(C0xi+D0ui−R−10 βˆ0)dW0, xi(0) = x0,
Jˆi(ui)=
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
|xi|2Q + |ui|2R − 2〈Ξ1xˆ+ Ξ2, xi〉+ 2〈(Q− Ξ1)h, xi〉
+ 2〈ATGh +GAh + CT0 Gg2 −ATΞG1 h− ΞG1 Ah− CT0 ΞG1 g2, xi〉
+ 2〈BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 g2), ui〉dt
+ 〈Gxi(T ), xi(T )〉 − 2〈ΞG1 xˆ(T ) + ΞG2 , xi(T )〉
}
.
(34)
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Here the triple (xˆ, βˆ0, h) satisfies the following limiting (off-line) system parameterized by undeter-
mined process uˆ :
dxˆ =(Axˆ+Buˆ+ f)dt+ (C0xˆ+D0uˆ−R−10 βˆ0)dW0,
dpˆ =−
(
AT pˆ+ CT0 βˆ0 −Qxˆ+ Ξ1xˆ+ Ξ2
)
dt+ βˆ0dW0,
dy =− (AT y+CT0 z+(Q−Ξ1)h+(Q−Ξ1)xˆ−Ξ2) dt+(AT (G−ΞG1 )h
+(G− ΞG1 )Ah+ CT0 (G− ΞG1 )f2
)
dt+ zdW0,
dh =Ahdt+
(
I +R−10 (G− ΞG1 )
)−1 (
C0h+R
−1
0 (z + βˆ0)
)
dW0,
xˆ(0)=x0, pˆ(T )=
(
ΞG1 −G
)
xˆ(T )+ΞG2 , y(T )=(G−ΞG1 )xˆ(T )−ΞG2 , h(0)=0.
(35)
Remark 4 FBSDE (35) can be decomposed into subsystems (xˆ, pˆ, βˆ0) and (h, y, z) which are decoupled
for each other. Thus, solvability of (35) reduces to that of (h, y, z) and (xˆ, pˆ, βˆ0) separately. Section 6
will discuss the global solvability of subsystem (h, y, z), and similar analysis can be applied to (xˆ, pˆ, βˆ0)
considering these two subsystems have similar coupling structures. Moreover, parameter process uˆ will
be further determined by some consistency condition system through mean-field game argument.
Let uˆ(t) ∈ F0t be fixed. We study the decentralized open-loop strategy and related consistency
condition system. We have the following result by maximum principle.
Theorem 4 Suppose that Q > 0, G > 0 and R > 0. Then the following backward stochastic differen-
tial equation (BSDE) admits a (unique) solution
dki=−
[
ATki+C
T
0 ζ0+Qxi−Ξ1xˆ+(Q−Ξ1)h−Ξ2+K(G, g2)−K(ΞG1 , g2)
]
dt
+ ζ0dW0 + ζidWi, ki(T ) = Gxi(T )− ΞG1 xˆ(T )− ΞG2 ,
(36)
where K(G, g2) = ATGh+GAh+ CT0 Gg2, K(ΞG1 , g2) = ATΞG1 h+ ΞG1 Ah+ CT0 ΞG1 g2 and
uˇi=−R−1(BTki+DT0 ζ0+DT ζi+BT (G−ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G−ΞG1 )g2), i=1, · · · , N. (37)
Proof. Since Q > 0, G > 0 and R > 0, (P3) is uniformly convex, which implies the unique
solvability of (P3). Assume that uˇi is the unique optimal control of Problem (P3) and xˇi is the state
equation under uˇi. Then
0 =δJˆi(uˇi, δui)
=E
∫ T
0
[〈
Qxˇi, δxi
〉
+
〈
Ruˇi, δui
〉− 〈Ξ1xˆ+ Ξ2, δxi〉+ 〈(Q− Ξ1)h, δxi〉]
+
〈K(G, g2)−K(ΞG1 , g2), δxi〉+ 〈BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2, δui〉dt
+
〈
Gxˇi(T ), δxi(T )
〉− 〈ΞG1 xˆ(T ) + ΞG2 , δxi(T )〉.
(38)
Given xˆ and h, (36) is a standard linear BSDE and thus has a unique solution (ki, ζ0, ζi). Then
〈Gxˇi(T )− ΞG1 xˆ(T )− ΞG2 , δxi(T )〉
=E
∫ T
0
{
〈−(Qxi − Ξ1xˆ− (Q− Ξ1)h− Ξ2 −K(G, g2) +K(ΞG1 , g2)), δxi〉
+ 〈ki, Bδui〉+ 〈ζ0,D0δui〉+ 〈ζi,Dδui〉
}
dt.
(39)
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From this and (38), we have
0 = E
∫ T
0
〈Ruˇi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2 +BTki +DT0 ζ0 +DT ζi, δui〉dt, (40)
which implies the open-loop optimal strategy:
uˇi =−R−1
(
BTki +D
T
0 ζ0 +D
T ζi +B
T (G − ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2
)
=−R−1(vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2).
Note that here,
vi := B
Tki +D
T ζi +D0ζ0. (41)

After the strategy (37) is applied, we obtain the following state equation:
dxi =
[
Axi −BR−1
(
vi +B
T (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2
)
+ f
]
dt
+
[−DR−1 (vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2)+ σ] dWi
+
[
C0xi −DR−1
(
vi +B
T (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2
)−R−10 βˆ0] dW0.
Consequently, consistency argument implies the following consistency condition (CC) system to (xˆ, βˆ0, h):
dxi=
[
Axi −BR−1(vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2) + f
]
dt
+
[
C0xi −D0R−1(vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2)−R−10 βˆ0
]
dW0
−[DR−1(vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2)− σ] dWi,
dki=−
[
ATki+C
T
0 ζ0+Qxi−Ξ1EF0 [xi]−Ξ2+(Q−Ξ1)h
+K(G, g2)−K(ΞG1 , g2)
]
dt+ζ0dW0 + ζidWi,
dpˆ=− [AT pˆ+ CT0 βˆ0 − (Q− Ξ1)EF0 [xi] + Ξ2]dt+ βˆ0dW0,
dy=− [AT y +CT0 z + (Q− Ξ1)h+ (Q− Ξ1)EF0
T
[xi]− Ξ2
]
dt
+ [AT (G− ΞG1 )h+(G− ΞG1 )Ah+ CT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2]dt+ zdW0,
dh=Ahdt+ [I +R−10 (G− ΞG1 )]−1[C0h+R−10 (z + βˆ0)]dW0,
xi(0)=x0, ki(T )=Gxi(T )−ΞG1 EF0
T
[xi(T )]−ΞG2 , pˆ(T )=(ΞG1 −G)EF0
T
[xi(T )]+Ξ
G
2 ,
y(T ) =(G− ΞG1 )EF0
T
[xi(T )]− ΞG2 , h(0) = 0.
(42)
Remark 5 CC system (42) differs from those in classical mean-field game literature (e.g., [18, 23, 35,
28]) by noting the evolution dynamics of xˆ is not explicitly specified here. Instead, it is characterized
by some implicit representation xˆ = EF0 [xi] which is embedded into an augmented mean-field type
FBSDE system of (xi, ki, pˆ, y, h) driven by a generic Brownian motion Wi independent of common
noise W0. CC system (42) is symmetric for all agents thus such representation is uniquely defined.
Such difference in CC representation is mainly caused by the presence of adjoint process term DT ζi
in the decentralized strategy design (refer to ( 41)). Thus, an explicit representation of xˆ becomes
unavailable, and a similar CC representation was derived in [14].
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6 Well-posedness of relevant FBSDEs
Our study in previous sections, especially the one related to decentralized strategy design and consis-
tency condition systems, involves various (fully-coupled) FBSDEs or Riccati equations. Keeping this
in mind, this section aims to discuss the existence and uniqueness of their (global) solvability. Note
that because of the introduction of soft constraints, these equations are intrinsically non-standard
(i.e., control/state weights are indefinite) thus their global solvability becomes more technical. More-
over, due to the uncertainty on volatility, it is necessary to treat the adjoint states of FBSDE which
closely connect to volatility, the diffusion term in BSDE formulation. As a sequel, the relevant analysis
becomes more complex considering the adjoint states are of less regularity property.
We consider the solvability of FBSDE (35) from Section 5. Similar analysis can be applied to
CC system (42) for which the arguments become more lengthy. By partial coupling of Remark 4, it
suffices to consider the following sub-system constructed by (h, y, z):
dh =Ahdt+ IG
(
C0h+R
−1
0 (z + βˆ0)
)
dW0(t),
dy =− (AT y +CT0 z + (Q− Ξ1)h+ (Q− Ξ1)xˆ− Ξ2) dt
+
(
AT (G− ΞG1 )h+ (G− ΞG1 )Ah+ CT0 (G− ΞG1 )f2
)
dt+ zdW0(t),
h(0) = 0, y(T ) = (G− ΞG1 )xˆ(T )− ΞG2 .
(43)
Equation (43) is a fully coupled FBSDE involving forward state h, backward state y and adjoint state
z. Moreover, it is nonstandard or indefinite because of the volatility uncertainty (thus, unlike definite
case, some weights are singular or negative due to its minmax feature). It is known that (global)
solvability of such indefinite FBSDE is by no means unconditional: to ensure its well-posedness, it
is always necessary to impose some additional compatibility conditions. Also, direction computation
indicates the monotonicity method, which is well applied to nonstandard FBSDE, fails to work here.
Reduction decoupling method. Our method is the reduction decoupling method proposed in
[39], which leads to the global solvability by imposing conditions on orthogonality of C0. Let Ψ1(·, s)
be the solution of the following ODE:
d
dt
Ψ1(t, s) =
(
A 0
Â −AT
)
Ψ1(t, s), t ∈ [s, T ],
Ψ1(s, s) = I,
where
Â
∆
= (Ξ1 −Q) +AT (G− ΞG1 ) + (G− ΞG1 )A+CT0 (G− ΞG1 )IGC0.
Denote Ψ1(t) = Ψ1(t, 0). Then we have
Ψ1(t) = exp
(
At 0
Ât −AT t
)
=
(
exp(At) 0∑∞
n=0
Λntn
n! exp(−AT t)
)
,
where
Λn
∆
= ÂAn−1 −AT ÂAn−2 + · · ·+ (−AT )k−1ÂAn−k + · · · + (−AT )n−1Â.
If A = AT and AÂ = ÂA, then
Λn =
{
ÂAn−1, n = 2k − 1,
0, n = 2k,
and ∞∑
n=1
Λnt
n
n!
= Â
∞∑
k=1
A2k−2t2k−1
(2k − 1)! .
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Further, if A is invertible, then
∞∑
n=1
Λnt
n
n!
= ÂA−1
eAt − e−At
2
.
We have
(0, I)
(
exp(AT ) 0∑∞
n=1
ΛnTn
n! exp(−ATT )
)(
I
GC0 0
0 0
)
=
(∑∞
n=1
ΛnTn
n! exp(−ATT )
)(IGC0 0
0 0
)
=
(∑∞
n=1
ΛnTn
n! I
GC0 0
)
.
Thus, if and only if
∑∞
n=1
ΛnTn
n! I
GC0 = 0, then
(0, I)Ψ1(T )
(
I
GC0 0
0 0
)
= 0. (44)
Note
(0, I)Ψ1(T )
(
0
−CT0 + CT0 (G− ΞG1 )IGR−10
)
= exp(−AT )(−CT0 + CT0 (G− ΞG1 )IGR−10 ) = 0
implies that CT0 [I − (G− ΞG1 )IGR−10 ] = 0, i.e., CT0 IG = 0. Since C0 6= 0 and IG is invertible, we have
(0, I)Ψ1(T )
(
0
−CT0 + CT0 (G− ΞG1 )IGR−10
)
6= 0.
Note that
(0, I)Ψ1(T )
(
0
I
)
= (0, I)
(
exp(AT ) 0∑∞
n=1
ΛnTn
n! exp(−ATT )
)(
0
I
)
=
( ∞∑
n=1
ΛnT
n
n!
exp(−ATT )
)( 0
I
)
= exp(−ATT ).
We have (0, I)Ψ1(T )
(
0
I
)
is invertible, and
(0, I)Ψ1(T, t)(R
−1
0 I
G, I)T = (0, I)
(
exp[A(T − t)] 0∑∞
n=1
Λn(T−t)n
n! exp[−AT (T − t)]
)(
IGR
−1
0
I
)
=
( ∞∑
n=1
Λn(T − t)n
n!
, exp(−AT (T − t)
)(
IGR
−1
0
I
)
=
∞∑
n=1
Λn(T − t)n
n!
IGR
−1
0 + exp[−AT (T − t)]. (45)
From the above analysis and Theorem 3.2 in [39], we have the following sufficient condition for solv-
ability of FBSDE (43).
Proposition 5 Let (H1) hold. Then (43) is solvable if
∑∞
n=1
ΛnTn
n! I
GC0=0 and (0, I)Ψ1 (T, ·)(R−10 IG, I)T
is full-rank.
Example 6 Consider the system (1)–(2) with parameters
A=
(
2 0
0 0
)
, C0=
(
3 1
0 2
)
, Q =
(
1 0
0 0.4
)
, R0 =
(
0.1 0
0 2
)
, Γ =
(
1 0
0 0.5
)
, G = 0.
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We have Â =
(
0 0
0 −0.1
)
and Λn = 0, n = 1, 2, · · · . From (45), we have
(0, I)Ψ1(T, ·)(R−10 IG, I)T = exp[−AT (T − t)]
is of row full-rank. By Proposition 5, FBSDE (43) is solvable.
7 Asymptotic optimality
Based on results of Section 6, we may assume the off-line system (35) and consistency system (42)
are well-posed (we do not specify which concrete conditions leads to it because our analysis below
only requires the wellposedness of these FBSDE systems) thus the decentralized control set uˇ =
(uˇ1, · · · , uˇN ) is well-defined through (37). The main theorem of this section states the asymptotic
robust social optimality of decentralized decision uˇ.
Definition 7 A set of control laws uˇ = (uˇ1, · · · , uˇN ) has asymptotic robust social optimality, if∣∣∣∣ 1N Jwosoc(uˇ)− 1N infui∈Uc Jwosoc(u)
∣∣∣∣ = o(1). (46)
Theorem 8 Assume that (H1), (H2′) and (H3) hold, and (35) and (42) admit a unique solution,
respectively. Then the set of control laws (37) has asymptotic robust social optimality with∣∣∣∣ 1N Jwosoc(uˇ)− 1N infui∈Uc Jwosoc(u)
∣∣∣∣ = O( 1√N ).
7.1 A quadratic functional representation
To verify asymptotic social optimality (46), it is helpful to construct some quadratic representation
of worse-case functional Jwosoc(u) for u = (u1, · · · , uN ) ∈ Rr×N . First, recall the compact notations
introduced in Section 3, and denote R = Diag(R, · · · , R), β¯i = [(βi1)T , · · · , (βiN )T ]T , i = 0, 1, · · · , N .
Then we can rewrite state (17) and cost functional (16) as follows:
dx =(Ax+Bu+ 1⊗ f)dt+
N∑
i=1
(Diu+ σi)dWi
+ (C0x+D0u− 1
N
(11T ⊗R−10 )β¯0dW0,
dp=− (ATp−Qˆx+ηˆ+CT0 β¯0)dt+
N∑
i=1
β¯idWi+β¯
0dW0,
x(0) =x0, p(T )=−Gˆx(T )+ηˆ0,
(47)
and
Jwosoc(u) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
(
|x|2
Qˆ
− 2ηˆTx+ |u|2R −
1
N
|β¯0|2
11T⊗R−1
0
)
dt+
1
2
E
(|x(T )|2
Gˆ
− 2ηˆT0 x(T )
)
, (48)
where ηˆ = 1⊗ Ξ2, ηˆ0 = 1⊗ ΞG2 , and Qˆ = (Qˆij), Gˆ = (Gˆij) are given by (5). Recall by Remark 2, we
may exchange the usage u = (uT1 , · · · , uTN )T with u = (u1, · · · , uN ).
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Moreover, by the superposition property of linear system (47), a straightforward calculation implies
that for any (u1,u2;x10,x
2
0; ηˆ
1
0 , ηˆ
2
0),
Jwosoc(u
1 + u2;x10 + x
2
0; ηˆ
1
0 + ηˆ
2
0) + J
wo
soc(u
1 − u2;x10 − x20; ηˆ10 − ηˆ20)
=2
(
Jwosoc(u
1;x10; ηˆ
1
0) + J
wo
soc(u
2;x20; ηˆ
2
0)
)
.
Thus, Jwosoc satisfies the parallelogram law and it is a quadratic functional with respect to control
process u(·) and initial-terminal condition pair (x0, ηˆ0). Then, by the symmetric peoprty of Jwosoc(u)
to inputs (u(·);x0; ηˆ0), the following quadratic representation holds true:
Jwosoc(u(·);x0; ηˆ0) =〈M1(u),u〉+ 2〈M12(x0, ηˆ0),u〉+ 〈M2(x0, ηˆ0), (x0, ηˆ0)〉
+ 2〈M13,u〉+ 2〈M23, (x0, ηˆ0)〉+M3,
(49)
for linear bounded self-adoint operators: M1 : U⊗Nc → U⊗Nc , M2 : SnN×nN , M3 ∈ R, and linear
bounded operators: M12 : R
nN × RnN → U⊗Nc , M13 ∈ U⊗N [0, T ], M23 ∈ RnN where U⊗Nc =
Uc × · · · × Uc︸ ︷︷ ︸
N−fold
, where 〈·〉 denotes the inner product in the sense of dt⊗ dP. More precisely, we have the
following representations. For operator M1,
M1(u) = Ru+B
Tm1 +
N∑
i=1
DTi n
i
1 +D
T
0 n
0
1;
〈M1(u),u〉 = E
∫ T
0
〈Ru+BTm1 +
N∑
i=1
DTi n
i
1 +D
T
0 n
0
1,u〉ds,
with 
dm1 = −(ATm1 +CT0 n01 + Qˆx1 + Qˆy1)dt+
N∑
i=1
ni1dWi + n
0
1dW0,
dy1 = Ay1dt+ (C0y1 +NR⊗ q01 +R⊗n01)dW0,
y1(0) = 0, m1(T ) = Gˆ(y1(T ) + x1(T )),
(50)

dx1 = (Ax1+Bu)dt+
N∑
i=1
DiudWi+(C0x1+D0u− 1
N
(11T ⊗R−10 )q01dW0,
dp1 = −(ATp1 − Qˆx1 +CT0 q01)dt+
N∑
i=1
qi1dWi + q
0
1dW0,
x1(0) = 0, p1(T ) = −Gˆx1(T ).
(51)
For operator M12, we have
M12(x, ηˆ0) = B
Tm2 +D
T
0 n
0
2 +
N∑
i=1
DTi n
i
2;
〈M12(x, ηˆ0),u〉 = E
∫ T
0
〈BTm2 +DT0 n02 +
N∑
i=1
DTi n
i
2,u〉dt,
with 
dm2 = −(ATm2 +CT0 n02 + Qˆx2 + Qˆy2)dt+ n02dW0 +
N∑
i=1
ni2dWi,
dy2 = Ay2dt+ (C0y2 +NR⊗q02 +R⊗n02)dW0,
m2(T ) = Gˆ(y2(T ) + x2(T )), y2(0) = 0
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and 
dx2 = Ax2dt+ (C0x2 −R⊗q02)dW0,
dp2 = −(ATp2 − Qˆx2 +CT0 q02)dt+
N∑
i=1
qi2dWi + q
0
2dW0,
x2(0) = x0, p2(T ) = −Gˆx2(T ) + ηˆ0.
For operator M13, we have
M13 = B
Tm13 +D
T
0 n
0
13 +
N∑
i=1
DTi n
i
13,
〈M13,u〉 = E
∫ T
0
〈BTm13 +DT0 n013 +
N∑
i=1
DTi n
i
13,u〉dt
where 
dm13 = −(ATm13 +CT0 n013 + Qˆx3 +Qy13 − 2ηˆs)ds+ n013dW0 +
N∑
i=1
ni13dWi,
dy13 = Ay13dt+ (C0y13 +NR⊗q013 +R⊗n013)dW0,
y13(0) = 0, m13(T ) = Gˆ(y13(T ) + x3(T ))− ηˆ0,
and 
dx3 = (Ax3 + 1⊗ f)dt+
N∑
i=1
σidWi + (C0x3 −R⊗q03)dW0,
dp3 = −(ATp3 − Qˆx3 + ηˆ +CT0 q03)dt+
N∑
i=1
qi3dWi + q
0
3dW0,
x3(0) = x0, p3(T ) = −Gˆx3(T ).
M2,M23, and M3 can be defined similarly. With above presentations, the Fre´chet differential of J
wo
soc
along the variation δu can be represented as
δJwosoc(u, δu) = 2〈M1u+M12(x, ηˆ0) +M13, δu〉.
7.2 Asymptotic optimality: four step procedure
Given the quadratic representation of Jwosoc(u) := J
(N)
soc (u, σ∗0(u)) by (49), we can verify the asymptotic
robust optimality stated in Theorem 8, through the following steps.
Step 1. We first analyze the asymptotic convergence of the realized state system. When each agent
Ai applies the open-loop decentralized strategy uˇi as
uˇi = −R−1
(
vi +B
T (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2
)
,
then the corresponding realized state xˇi is given by the following fully-coupled FBSDE subsystem
together with backward and adjoint states (pˇi, βˇ
0
i , {βˇki }Nk=1) :
dxˇi =
[
Axˇi −BR−1
(
vi +B
T (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2
)
+ f
]
dt
+
[−DR−1 (vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2)+ σ] dWi
+
[
C0xˇi−DR−1
(
vi+B
T (G−ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G−ΞG1 )g2
)−σ∗0(uˇ)] dW0,
dpˇi =− (AT pˇi + CT0 βˇ0i −Qxˇi + Ξ1xˇ(N) + Ξ2)dt+ βˇ0i dW0 +
N∑
k=1
βˇki dWk,
xˇi(0) = x, pˇi(T ) = (−G)xˇi(T ) + ΞG1 xˇ(N)(T ) + ΞG2
(52)
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where xˇ(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xˇi, σ
∗
0(uˇ) =
R−1
0
N
∑N
k=1 βˇ
0
k .Moreover, vi = B
Tki+D
T
0 ζ0+D
T ζi is defined through
the following CC system for a representative agent Ai:
dxi =
[
Axi −BR−1(vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2) + f
]
dt
+
[
C0xi−D0R−1(vi+BT (G−ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G−ΞG1 )g2)−R−10 βˆ0
]
dW0
− [DR−1(vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2)− σ] dWi,
dki =−
[
ATki + C
T
0 ζ0 +Qxi − Ξ1EF0 [xi]− Ξ2 + (Q−Ξ1)h
+K(G, g2)−K(ΞG1 , g2)
]
dt+ ζ0dW0 + ζidWi,
dpˆ =− [AT pˆ+ CT0 βˆ0 − (Q− Ξ1)EF0 [xi] + Ξ2]dt+ βˆ0dW0,
dy =− [AT y + CT0 z + (Q− Ξ1)h+ (Q− Ξ1)EF0 [xi]− Ξ2]dt
+ [AT (G− ΞG1 )h+ (G− ΞG1 )Ah+ CT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2]dt+ zdW0,
dh = Ahdt+ [I +R−10 (G− ΞG1 )]−1[C0h+R−10 (z + βˆ0)]dW0
(53)
with the initial-terminal condition{
xi(0) = x, ki(T ) = Gxi(T )− ΞG1 EF0
T
[xi(T )]− ΞG2 ,
pˆ(T )=(ΞG1 −G)EF0
T
[xi(T )]+Ξ
G
2 , y(T )=(G−ΞG1 )EF0
T
[xi(T )]−ΞG2 , h(0) = 0.
(54)
Note that all such N -subsystems
(
pˇj , βˇ
0
j , {βˇkj }Nk=1
)N
j=1
of (52) are further coupled via the worst-
volatility σ∗0 =
∑N
k=1 βˇ
0
k and they thus frame a fully-coupled and highly-dimensional FBSDE system
in L2F (Ω;C([0,T ];R
nN)) × L2F (0,T ;RnN)) × L2F (0, T ;RnN
2
). Regarding system (52)-(53), we have the
following prior estimate:
Proposition 9 Let (H1), (H2′) hold. Assume (35) and (42) admit a unique solution, respectively.
Then
E sup
0≤t≤T
(
|xˇ(N) − EF0 [xi]|2 + |pˇ(N) − pˆ|2
)
+ E
∫ T
0
|R0σ∗0(uˇ)− βˆ0|2dt ≤ c0(
1
N
) (55)
for some constant c0 > 0 independent of N and i. Here, pˇ
(N) = 1
N
∑
pˇi.
Proof. Making the state aggregation of (52), we have
dxˇ(N) =
[
Axˇ(N) −BR−1
(
v(N) +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2
)
+ f
]
dt
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
[−DR−1 (vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2)+ σ] dWi
+
[
C0xˇ
(N)−DR−1
(
v(N)+BT (G−ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G−ΞG1 )g2
)
−σ∗0(uˇ)
]
dW0,
dpˇ(N)=−[AT pˇ(N)+CT0 βˇ(N)0 +(Ξ1 −Q)xˇ(N)+Ξ2]dt+βˇ(N)0 dW0+ 1N
N∑
i=1
N∑
k=1
βˇki dWk,
xˇ(N)(0) = x0, pˇ
(N)(T ) = (ΞG1 −G)xˇ(N)(T ) + ΞG2 ,
(56)
where v(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 vi. By (53), EF0 [xi] satisfies
dEF0 [xi] =
[
AEF0 [xi]−BR−1(vˆ +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G − ΞG1 )g2) + f
]
dt
+
[
C0EF0 [xi]−D0R−1(vˆ +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G − ΞG1 )g2)−R−10 βˆ0
]
dW0,
EF0 [xi](0) = x0,
(57)
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where vˆ = EF0 [BTki+DT0 ζ0+D
T ζi]. Assume (42) admits a unique solution thus its state component
(ki, ζ0, ζi, h) should have an upper bound in their L
2−norms. Thus, sup0≤t≤T EI2N (t) = O( 1N ) with
IN :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
[−DR−1 (vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2)+ σ] dWi.
Moreover, wellposedness of (42) implies some compatibility condition holds true and the iterative
scheme of coupled FBSDE works. Then, we can apply the standard continuity-dependence estimate
between system (52) and system (53) to get the estimate (55).
Step 2. Given Step 1, we have the estimate to the realized social cost Jwosoc(uˇ).
Proposition 10 There exists a constant c1 independent of N such that
Jwosoc(uˇ) 6 Nc1.
Proof. Consider the following intermediate state:
dxi =
[
Axi −BR−1
(
vi +B
T (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2
)
+ f
]
dt
+
[−DR−1 (vi +BT (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2)+ σ] dWi
+
[
C0xi −DR−1
(
vi +B
T (G− ΞG1 )h+DT0 (G− ΞG1 )g2
)−R−10 βˆ0]dW0.
By Proposition 9, and standard FBSDE estimate, the following estimate holds:
E sup
06t6T
|xˇi(t)− xi(t)|2 6 c1
N
.
Then,
Jwosoc(uˇ) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{∣∣(xi − Γxˆ− η) + (xˇi − xi) + Γ(xˆ− Γxˇ(N))∣∣2Q
+ |uˇi|2R − |(σ∗0(uˇ)− βˆ0) + βˆ0|2R0
}
dt
+
1
2
E|(xi(T )− Γ0xˆ(T )− η0) + (xˇi(T )− xi(T )) + Γ0(xˇ(N)(T )− (xˇi(T ))|2G
6Nc2
(‖f‖L2 + ‖σ‖L2 + ‖Ξ2‖L2 + ‖ΞG2 ‖L2 +O( 1N )) 6 Nc.
Step 3. This step aims to address the convexity of Jwosoc(u) of (P2). By its quadratic representation
(49), it is equivalent to 〈M1(u),u〉 > 0. Here,
M1(u) = Ru+B
Tm1 +
N∑
i=1
DTi n
i
1 +D
T
0 n
0
1
with (m1,n
i
1,n
0
1) given by (50). By examining its coupling structure of (50)-(51), it can be further
reformulated via the following problem:
J0soc(u) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
{∣∣x`i − Γx`(N)∣∣2Q + |ui|2R − |β`(N)0 |2R−1
0
}
dt,
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where β`
(N)
0 =
1
N
∑N
i=1 β`
0
i , and for i = 1, · · · , N,
dx`i =(Ax`i +Bui)dt+DuidWi +
(
C0x`i +D0ui − R
−1
0
N
N∑
k=1
β`0k
)
dW0,
dp`i =− (AT p`i + CT0 β`0i −Qx`i + Ξ1x`(N))dt+ β`0i dW0 +
N∑
k=1
β`ki dWk,
x`i(0) = 0, p`i(T ) = (−G)x`i(T ) + ΞG1 x`(N)(T ).
Then Jwosoc(u) of (P2) is convex if and only if J
0
soc(u) > 0. Notice the upper bound of realized cost
functional Jwosoc(uˇ) by Proposition 10, it suffices to consider the perturbation control u˜ satisfying
Jwosoc(u˜) 6 J
wo
soc(uˇ) 6 Nc1. This further implies that
‖u˜‖2L2 :=
N∑
i=1
E
∫ T
0
|u˜i(t)|2dt 6 Nc (58)
by noting (P2) is convex. Also, it implies ‖δu˜‖2
L2
:=
∑N
i=1 E
∫ T
0 |δu˜i(t)|2dt ≤ Nc1 with δui = uˇi − u˜i.
Step 4. This step discusses the Fre´chet differential of Jwosoc(u). Recall the quadratic functional (49)
and notation exchange between u and u, we have
Jwosoc(u) =〈M1(u),u〉+ 2〈M12(x0, ηˆ0),u〉+ 〈M2(x0, ηˆ0), (x0, ηˆ0)〉
+ 2〈M13,u〉+ 2〈M23, (x0, ηˆ0)〉+M3
=〈M1(uˇ), uˇ〉+ 2〈M12(x0, ηˆ0), uˇ〉+ 〈M2(x0, ηˆ0), (x0, ηˆ0)〉
+ 2〈M13, uˇ〉+ 2〈M23, (x0, ηˆ0)〉+M3 (= Jwosoc(uˇ))
+ 〈M1(u− uˇ),u− uˇ〉+ 2〈M13,u− uˇ〉 (= J0soc(u− uˇ))
+ 2〈M1(u) +M12(x, ηˆ0) +M13,u− uˇ〉 (= 〈DuJwosoc(uˇ),u− uˇ〉)
=Jwosoc(uˇ) + J
0
soc(u− uˇ) +
N∑
i=1
〈DuiJwosoc(uˇ), ui − uˇi〉
where DuiJwosoc(uˇ) given by (23) is the componentwise Fre´chet derivative of Jwosoc at uˇ on ith-component
coordinate. Moreover, for u, by examining the person-by-person optimality procedures in Section 4.1,
and duality expression (33) for auxiliary cost Jˆi, we have
‖DuiJwosoc(uˇ)−Dui Jˆi(uˇ)‖L2 6
c√
N
‖uˇ‖L2
for some constant c independent of N and uˇ.
Proof. (Proof of Theorem 8). Notice that∣∣∣∣ 1N Jwosoc(uˇ)− 1N infui∈Uc Jwosoc(u)
∣∣∣∣ = O( 1√N )
is equivalent to
inf
ui∈Uc
Jwosoc(u) 6 J
wo
soc(uˇ) 6 inf
ui∈Uc
Jwosoc(u) +O(
√
N).
The first inequality is trivial. For the second inequality, we need only consider the perturbed control
u satisfying Jwosoc(u) 6 J
wo
soc(uˇ) which is bounded in its L
2-norm by Step 2, namely ||u||2
L2
6 cN with c
24
independent of N. Now, by Steps 3 and 4, for all such perturbed u,
Jwosoc(u)− Jwosoc(uˇ) =J0soc(u− uˇ) +
N∑
i=1
〈DuiJwosoc(uˇ), ui − uˇi〉
>γ||δu||2L2 +
N∑
i=1
〈DuiJwosoc(uˇ), δui〉.
(59)
Moreover, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
N∑
i=1
〈DuiJwosoc(uˇ), δui〉 6
√√√√ N∑
i=1
‖DuiJwosoc(uˇ)‖2L2
N∑
i=1
‖δui‖2L2
6c
√√√√ N∑
i=1
O(
1
N
)‖uˇ‖2
L2
N∑
i=1
‖δui‖2L2 = O(
√
N)
(60)
where the last inequality is due to (38) and Proposition 9 of Step 1. Also, note that Dui Jˆi(uˇ) = 0 for
i = 1, · · · , N due to the person-by-person optimality and Theorem 4. Thus, the asymptotic optimality
(46) follows directly by (59) and (60).
8 Concluding remarks
This paper investigated mean field LQG social control with volatility uncertain common noise. Based
on a two-step-duality technique, we construct an auxiliary optimal control problem. Through solving
this problem combined with consistent mean field approximations, we design a set of decentralized
strategies and verify their asymptotically social optimality. An interesting and challenging work for
further study is to consider the indefinite R or R0; or state variable enters the term driven by Wi.
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